ANNA J. BROWN United States District Judge
Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan issued Findings and Recommendation (#27) on March 6, 2015, in which she recommends the Court grant Defendant's Motion (#14) for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion (#17) for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed timely Objections to the Findings and Recommendation.
The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).
When any party objects to any portion of the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the Magistrate Judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Plaintiff brought his claims after the relevant statute of limitations had expired and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s alternative recommendation that the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Defendant’s bona-fide error defense.
For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.
I. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff contends Defendant, a debt collector, misrepresented the amount of the debt owed by Plaintiff to one of Defendant’s clients in the course of small-claims court litigation over nonpayment of the debt, and, therefore, Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1). The FDCPA contains a one- year statute of limitations “from the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
Plaintiff alleges three misrepresentations of the amounts owed on two accounts that provide the basis for his FDCPA claims: (1) a complaint filed in the small-claims court case on February 15, 2013, that erroneously represented Plaintiff owed $2, 216.08 on the debt; (2) a March 14, 2013, letter to the small-claims court that made reference to the “$2, 200” Defendant sought in the complaint filed February 15, 2013; and (3) a revised representation made at a small-claims court hearing on April 17, 2013, in which Defendant represented Plaintiff owed approximately $1, 891.49 on the debt.
The small-claims court awarded $1, 885.97 to Defendant.
Plaintiff filed his action in this Court on February 28, 2014. The Magistrate Judge found (and Plaintiff no longer contests) that Defendant's alleged violations of the FDCPA would have had to occur between February 28, 2013, and February 28, 2014, to be within the FDCPA’s statute of limitations.
The Magistrate Judge concluded all of the alleged misrepresentations were outside of the relevant statute of limitations because the March 14, 2013, and April 17, 2013, alleged misrepresentations related to the original February 15, 2013, small-claims court complaint. The Magistrate Judge relied on the Findings and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Dennis J. Hubel in Linfoot v. Bernardi, No. 03:12-cv-00799-HU (#23), 2013 WL 958279 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2013), for the proposition that “subsequent communications regarding an existing claim do not ‘start a fresh statute of limitations period.’” Id. (quoting Reese v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 686 F.Supp.2d 1921, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009)).
The FDCPA prohibits a “false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” or “[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692f(1). Thus, the question before this Court is whether each communication to the small-claims court was a new “false representation” or “collection” of an amount greater than that which was actually owed or whether the subsequent communications with the small-claims court related back to the singular “representation” or “collection” in the small-claims court complaint.
Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on Magistrate Judge Hubel’s Findings and Recommendation in Linfoot because, according to Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Sullivan “misrepresent[ed]” the holding of Linfoot as modified by Judge Mosman. See Linfoot v. Bernardi, No. 3:12-cv-00799-HU (#28), 2013 WL 957634 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2013)(order by Judge Mosman adopting as modified Judge Hubel’s Findings and Recommendation). In Linfoot the Court considered when the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim in which the plaintiff alleged the debt collector violated § 1692g(b) when it failed to cease collection efforts (or to validate the debt) after the plaintiff challenged the debt. In Linfoot the plaintiff argued “each and every subsequent collection activity . . . was itself a separate and new ‘triggering event, ’ for the purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations is a bar.” Judge Mosman observed even though “[t]hat may be true in improper form of communication cases where each communication is itself a new violation that potentially triggers a new limitations period, ” the “form of communication” cases (i.e., cases in which the debt-collection violation is communication with the debtor in an impermissible manner) are distinguishable from a debt collector’s duty to cease debt-collection activities after the debtor disputes the debt. Thus, Judge Mosman ...