Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Grimm v. Nooth

United States District Court, D. Oregon

April 7, 2015

JASON J. GRIMM, Petitioner,
v.
MARK NOOTH, Respondent.

ANTHONY D. BORNSTEIN, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, Attorney for Petitioner.

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, Attorney General, NICK M. KALLSTROM, Assistant Attorney General Department of Justice, Salem, OR, Attorneys for Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

ANNA J. BROWN, District Judge.

Petitioner, an inmate at the Snake River Correctional Institution, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ยง 2254. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2).

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2000, Petitioner was convicted in Multnomah County for Arson in the First Degree. The trial judge determined Petitioner was a Dangerous Offender under Oregon statutes and imposed an indeterminate sentence of 30 years of imprisonment (with a 48-month determinate term), subject to review and modification by the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the "Board").

Petitioner was released to post-prison supervision in 2007, and re-incarcerated in 2008 upon violating the conditions of his post-prison supervision release. After the revocation of his post-prison supervision release, the Board appointed psychologists to evaluate Petitioner. A psychologist who evaluated Petitioner in 2008 found he had a severe antisocial personality disorder and was not amenable to community-based supervision. Petitioner was evaluated again in 2009. The psychologist who conducted the 2009 evaluation diagnosed Petitioner with an antisocial personality disorder and a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and concluded Petitioner would remain a danger to the community if released.

On January 6, 2010, the Board issued an Order deferring Petitioner's parole consideration date for 48 months. Resp. Exh. 103, pp. 161-63. The Board based its decision upon a finding that

[T]he [Petitioner] has a mental or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predisposing [Petitioner] to the commission of any crime to a degree rendering [Petitioner] a danger to the health or safety of others; therefore, the condition which made [Petitioner] dangerous is not in remission and [Petitioner] does continue to remain a danger.

Resp. Exh. 103, p. 162.

Petitioner sought administrative review, arguing that the Board denied parole "solely upon my mental or emotional disturbance" and that the denial violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Resp. Exh. 103, p. 166. The Board denied relief, explaining part:

[T]he Board finds your allegation contains a mistaken premise: the Board's finding was that your mental or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predisposes you to the commission of any crime to a degree rendering you a danger to the health or safety of others. The deferral of your parole consideration date was based on your dangerousness, not on your condition or disorder.

Resp. Exh. 103, pp. 180-81.

Petitioner then sought judicial review before the Oregon Court of Appeals. Resp. Exh. 102. Pe ti ti oner asserted that the Board's order deferring his parole consideration date violated both state law and the ADA "[b] ecause an equally dangerous yet non-disabled offender would be released on parole while petitioner would not be released because of his disabling mental illness[.)" Resp. Exh. 104, p. 28. In a written opinion, the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.