United States District Court, D. Oregon
January 12, 2015
TERRY PAUL HEDIN, Plaintiffs,
JAUN CASTILLO, et al., Defendants
Terry Paul Hedin, Plaintiff, Pro se, SHERIDAN, OR.
For Haun D. Castillo, Regional Director, Western Region, in their individual capacities, Marion Feather, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, in their individual capacities, Richard Kowalczck, Head Chaplian, Federal Correctional Institution, in their individual capacities, Daniel Williams, Chaplian, Federal Correctional Institutional, in their individual capacities, Defendants: Natalie K. Wight, LEAD ATTORNEY, United States Attorney's Office, Portland, OR.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Mark D. Clarke, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, filed a complaint alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment Constitutional rights by interfering with his practice of the Asatru religion. Plaintiff now moves for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction (#14).
Specifically, plaintiff requests the court to issue a temporary restraining order directing defendants " not to retaliate against him, i.e. excessive shakedown, disciplinary-reports" and for the court to order defendants to provide a " full briefing as to their past practice of retaliation against inmates who file prisoner grievances and/or pursue lawsuits for legal redress of grievances." Motion (#14) p. 5.
Requests for temporary restraining orders are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See,
New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. , 434 U.S. 1345, 1347, n. 2, 98 S.Ct. 359, 54 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977);
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States District Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
" A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish  that he is likely to succeed on the merits,  that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,  that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and  that an injunction is in the public interest." Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)); Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, American Trucking Associations, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (" To the extent our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling or even viable.").
In addition, incarcerated inmates cannot receive preliminary injunctions against prison officials without also satisfying the " comprehensive set of standards" set forth in the PLRA. Gilmore v. People of the State of Calif., 220 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 200). The PLRA provides that federal courts " shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
In this case, the injunctive relief that plaintiff seeks has nothing to do with his underlying claims, and he has not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on the merits on those claims. Moreover, plaintiff has not identified any irreparable harm that he would incur if he is not exempted from standard prison security measures such as " shakedowns" and disciplinary measures. In addition, plaintiff's request is overly broad and not narrowly tailored to prevent any specifically identified risk of irreparable harm. Lastly, I find that the public interest weighs in favor of leaving to BOP officials the decision of when and how the safety and security of the institution is best protected by imposing searches and disciplinary action.
Based on all of the foregoing, plaintiff's Motion (#14) should be denied.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a) (1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.