United States District Court, D. Oregon
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
PAUL PAPAK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Ismael Quintero, Jr. brings this pro se action against defendant Katie A. Suver, alleging that Suver, as Deputy District Attorney for the Marion County District Attorney's Office, violated his civil rights, resulting in an illegal and invalid judgment in his state-court criminal case. Now before the court is Suver's motion for summary judgment (#31). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment should be granted and this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
On March 4, 2002, a grand jury returned an amended indictment against Quintero, charging him with one count of delivery of 10 grams or more of methamphetamine (Count One), one count of delivery of 10 grams or more of cocaine (Count Two), and one count of manufacturing 10 grams or more of cocaine (Count Three). See Ex. 1, Declaration of Michael R. Washington ("Washington Decl."), #32, at 3; Ex. 1, Complaint, #1-1, at 1. Suver began representing the State of Oregon in the case during Quintero's January 17, 2006 change-of-plea hearing, during which he pied guilty to all three counts of the amended indictment. See Ex. 1, Washington Decl., #32, at 7; see also Ex. 3, Washington Decl., #32, at 12-14 (plea agreement). That same date, the court sentenced Quintero to ninety months on Count One, forty-five months on Count Two, and forty-five months on Count Three. See Ex. 3, Washington Decl., #32, at 15-20. The sentences on Counts Two and Three were to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence imposed in Count One, for a total term of imprisonment of 135 months. See id
Quintero thereafter filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the County of Umatilla. See Ex. 2, Washington Decl., #32, at 1; see also Ex. 3, Washington Decl., #32, at 21-22. The petition was granted in part on the basis that Quintero's counsel failed to object to a sentencing-grid error. See Ex. 3, Washington Decl., #32, at 21-22; see also id at 7. Quintero's sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded to the Circuit Court for the County of Marion for resentencing. See id at 21-22; see also id. at 7.
After the case was remanded, Quintero moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing, among other things, that his pleas were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, as the prosecuting attorney had "intentionally withheld and misused evidence that was clearly exculpatory, " including a forensics report. See id at 33. The court denied Quintero's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See Ex. 1, Washington Decl., #32, at 13. On April 13, 2011, the court resentenced Quintero to ninety-months on Count One, thirty-six months on Count Two, and eighteen months on Count Three, with nine months of the sentence on Count Three to run concurrently to the sentences on Counts One and Two, for a total term of imprisonment of 135 months. See Ex. 3, Washington Decl., #32, at 52-57. On May 12, 2011, Quintero filed an appeal, which he voluntarily dismissed on or about May 2, 2012. See Ex. 1, Washington Decl., #32, at 14-15. On August 29, 2012, Quintero filed a petition for post-conviction reliefin the Circuit Court for the County of Marion. See Ex. 6, Washington Decl., #32, at 1. That case remains pending. See id.
On September 25, 2013, Quintero filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Suver violated his constitutional rights when, among other things, she: (1) improperly calculated the crime seriousness levels on Counts Two and Three; (2) failed to properly determine his release date; (3) lied to the court regarding the weight of the drugs involved in Counts Two and Three and lied about the lab report; (4) misapplied the sentencing guidelines in violation of Quintero's Fifth Amendment rights; (5) improperly sentenced him twice for delivery and manufacture; (6) improperly merged powdered and rock cocaine to get a quantity necessaty to increase the crime seriousness level; (7) violated Quintero's right to be free from double jeopardy; (8) failed to call the criminalist before the lab report was put into evidence; and (9) violated Quintero's constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence via the lab report. According to Quintero, due to Suver's actions, he "was wrongfully charged, wrongfully indicted, wrongfully sentenced, wrongfully convicted, and wrongfully incarcerated, which resulted in illegal and false imprisonment." Complaint, #1, at 10-11. Quintero seeks damages in the amount of "$10 million per year of incarceration" and an additional "$7, 094, 000.00 for punitive damages." Id. at 12.
On May 14, 2014, Suver filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she is entitled to summary judgment in her favor because: (1) she is immune from suit under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity; (2) Quintero's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) Quintero's claims are barred under the Eleventh Amendment; (4) pursuant to Oregon law, a petition for post-conviction relief is the exclusive means for challenging a criminal judgment; (5) Quintero was not subjected to double jeopardy; and (6) Suver is entitled to qualified immunity. See Suver's Motion for Summary Judgment, #31. On May 28, 2014, Quintero filed a resistance to the motion for summary judgment. See Quintero's Resistance, #35. On June 4, 2014, Quintero filed a supplemental resistance to the motion for summary judgment. See Quintero's Supplemental Resistance, #36. The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
As set forth below, Quintero's claims should be dismissed on the grounds that: (1) the claims are barred, in part, by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the claims are Heck -barred; and (3) Suver is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Given that I find that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Suver on these grounds, I find it unnecessary to address her other arguments.
I. Eleventh Amendment
First, to the extent Quintero is suing Suver in her official capacity, Suver is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Section 1983 applies to "[e]very person" who, under color of state law, deprives a United States citizen of his or her constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), the United States Supreme Court "held that States or governmental entities that are considered arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not persons' under § 1983." Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation marks omitted). A suit against a state official in her official capacity "is no different from a suit against the State itself." Id. at 825 (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71) (internal quotation mark omitted). "Therefore, state officials sued in their official capacities... are not persons' within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id.
Here, Suver was acting as an arm of the State of Oregon when she prosecuted Quintero for violations of state law. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 8.680; see also Duma v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-01465-HZ, 2014 WL 1874051, at *3 (D. Or. May 7, 2014) ("The District Attorney's Office is an arm of the State, not the county."); Rauch v. Columbia Cnty., No. CV 05-914-HA, 2005 WL 2104586 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2005) ("District attorneys are state, not local, officials, see generally Oregon Revised Statute Chapter 8...."). Thus, insofar as Quintero ...