United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
OPINION AND ORDER
ANCER L. HAGGERTY, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Chase Bank USA, N.A., filed this lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment regarding the validity and enforceability of a deed of trust for the home of defendant Dianne Comer. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment  against Comer on May 27, 2014. Oral argument was held on July 21, 2014. For the following reasons, plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment  is granted.
On April 4, 1997, Allen Peterman, Comer's former husband, purchased the home at 18183 SE ED Anna Court, Milwaukie, Oregon 97267 (the "Property"). To fund his purchase, Peterman borrowed $132, 640.00 from Crossland Mortgage Corporation, and in exchange, Peterman executed a deed of trust for the Property, naming Crossland Mortgage Corporation as the beneficiary. The borrower of that deed of trust is identified as "ALLEN PETERMAN, AS AN INDIVIDUAL." Stines Decl. Ex. A.
At the time that Peterman purchased the Property, he was already married to Comer. Stines Decl. Ex. F at 3. The couple decided to purchase the Property in Peterman's name only, because they had concerns regarding Comer's credit score. Stines Decl. Ex. F at 4. Although her name was not on the title, Comer and Peterman equally contributed to mortgage payments throughout their marriage. Stines Deel. Ex. F. at 5.
On April 16, 2001, Peterman borrowed $131, 500.00 from plaintiff to pay off and refinance his original loan. Peterman granted a deed of trust to plaintiff, and the deed identifies the borrower as "ALLEN PETERMAN, MARRIED & SOLE OWNER." Stines Decl. Ex. B.
Because Comer wanted to be named on the title to the Property, on June 3, 2003, Peterman executed a quitclaim deed, which conveyed Peterman's sole interest in the Property to both Peterman and Comer. Stines Decl. Ex. G.
Peterman refinanced his loan again on November 14, 2003. He borrowed $130, 000.00 from plaintiff to pay off and refinance his 2001 Chase loan. The 2003 deed of trust identifies the borrower as "ALLEN PETERMAN, MARRIED." Stines Decl. Ex. C.
Peterman refinanced his loan a final time on January 30, 2007. He borrowed $187, 000.00 from plaintiff to pay off and refinance his 2003 Chase loan. The 2007 deed of trust identifies the borrower as "ALLEN PETERMAN." Stines Decl. Ex. D.
In August of 2009, Peterman and Comer divorced and the court entered a General Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage; and Money Award, which was submitted and signed by Comer. Stines Decl. Ex. H at 11. In that document, Comer was awarded the Property. Stines Decl. Ex. Hat 4. The document also distributed the couple's debts. Among other things, Comer agreed to pay the 2007 debt owed to plaintiff with a balance of $189, 000.00. Stines Decl. Ex. H at 5.
Around the time of the divorce and thereafter, three quitclaim deeds have been recorded for the Property, conveying interests to Comer and one of her sons, then to both of Comer's sons, and finally back to Comer, individually. Stines Decl. Exs. J, K, L.
A party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bahn v. NME Hasps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). The moving party carries the initial burden of proof and meets this burden by identifying portions of the record on file that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). Once the initial burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate through the production of probative evidence that there remains an issue of fact to be tried. Id
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Metro PCS, Inc. v. City & County of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, summary ...