United States District Court, D. Oregon
STEVEN LEE BRUCE Plaintiff, Pro Se.
S. AMANDA MARSHALL, United States Attorney, ADRIAN L. BROWN, Assistant United States Attorney.
DAVID MORADO, Regional Chief Counsel, ERIN F. HIGHLAND, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Social Security Administration, Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
ANNA J. BROWN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Steven Lee Bruce seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on September 21, 2006, alleging a disability onset date of December 15, 1999. Tr. 116-20. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on January 13, 2009. Tr. 41-78. At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified.
The ALJ issued a decision on March 18, 2009, in which he found Plaintiff was not disabled before his September 30, 2006, date last insured and, therefore, is not entitled to benefits. Tr. 29-40. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d), that decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on November 8, 2010, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.
Plaintiff was born November 21, 1965, and was 43 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 116. Plaintiff completed high school. Tr. 39. Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work experience. Tr. 39, 154.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to back, neck, leg, and hand pain, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Tr. 150.
Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence. See Tr. 32, 35-38.
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate his inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 (quoting Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)). "It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence] but less than a preponderance." Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).
I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Each step is potentially dispositive.
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). The claimant's RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. "A regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other words, the Social Security Act does not require complete incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from his December 15, 1999, alleged onset date through his September 30, 2006, date last insured. Tr. 31.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff, before his date last insured, had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, and an anxiety disorder. Tr. 31. The ALJ found Plaintiff's impairment of pain in his neck, back, legs, and hands was not severe before Plaintiff's date last insured. Tr. 31. The ALJ found Plaintiff did not suffer from PTSD. Tr. 32.
At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, before his September 30, 2006, date last insured. Tr. 32. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work through his date last insured.
Specifically [Plaintiff] was capable of lifting and/or carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, standing and/or walking 6 of hours [ sic ], and sitting 6 of 8 hours. Further [Plaintiff] was capable of frequent balance, and occasionally climbing of ramps/stairs, as well as, occasionally, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. As to mental residual ...