KRISTINA HELLMAN, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR.
ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, Attorney General, JONATHAN W. DIEHL, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Salem, OR.
OPINION AND ORDER
OWEN M. PANNER, District Judge.
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is DENIED.
On February 11, 1999, petitioner strangled a seven-year-old girl to death and buried her body in his basement bedroom. Petitioner was 16 at the time. On February 15, 1999, petitioner was interrogated by two law enforcement officials, Clatsop County Detective Joseph Calistro and F.B.I. Agent Donald McMullen. Petitioner confessed to the crime. Later that day, petitioner was interviewed by Dr. Frank Calistro, a psychologist employed by the District Attorney's Orfice. Petitioner again confessed.
On February 19, 1999, a Clatsop County grand jury indicted petitioner on three counts of aggravated murder. The trial court appointed attorney Griffith C.S. Healy to represent petitioner, along with a defense team including co-counsel Laura Graser, investigator Peter Moursund, mitigation specialist Denise Johnson, psychologists Drs. Bolstad and Sack, and therapist Judy Bouton. The trial court subsequently appointed attorney Ralph Monson as special counsel for petitioner for an aid and assist hearing.
Prior to trial, counsel moved that petitioner be tried as a juvenile, but the trial court denied that motion. Counsel also moved to suppress petitioner's statements to the two law enforcement officers and to the state's psychologist. After an extensive suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
Petitioner waived a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court. Trial counsel raised affirmative defenses of mental disease or defect, diminished capacity, and lack of intent. Counsel also attempted to assert a defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial judge struck the defense because under Oregon law extreme emotional distress is not a defense to aggravated murder.
After a lengthy trial, the judge found petitioner guilty of two counts of aggravated murder. The trial judge sentenced petitioner to life without the possibility of parole.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Harned, 194 Or.App. 726, 99 P.3d 1237, rev. denied, 337 Or. 616, 103 P.3d 639 (2004)
Petitioner then filed a petition for state post-conviction relief ("PCR"). Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR trial judge denied relief. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Harned v. Hill, 229 Or.App. 740, 213 P.3d 875, rev. denied, 347 Or. 258, 218 P.3d 540 (2009).
On November 25, 2009, Magistrate Judge Paul Papak appointed counsel to represent petitioner in a federal habeas corpus action. On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In it, he alleges five claims for relief:
First Claim for Relief: Violations of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution Miranda/Involuntary Statements
[Petitioner] pleads on information, belief, and/or personal knowledge that his convictions were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the trial court allowed the introduction of [petitioner's] statements, despite the fact that (1) [petitioner] did not make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights; (2) [petitioner's] statements were involuntary and were the product of police overreaching and promises of leniency; (3) [petitioner's] statements to the psychologist were tainted by the illegality of the initial statements; and (4) [petitioner's] statements to the psychologist were themselves involuntary.
Second Claim for Relief: Violation of the Sixth, Eighth, Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution Deprivation of the Right to Present a Defense, Compulsory Process, and Equal Protection
[Petitioner] pleads on information, belief, and/or personal knowledge that his convictions were obtained in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the trial court granted the state's motion to strike the defense of extreme emotional disturbance set forth in Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.135(1) because the Oregon Supreme Court's limitation on the extreme emotional disturbance in State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996), unconstitutionally prevented [petitioner] from presenting available evidence to negate the mental state of aggravated murder.
Third Claim for Relief: Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution Violation of Due Process
[Petitioner] pleads on information, belief, and/or personal knowledge that his convictions were obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the state failed to hold a remand hearing or require some kind of judicial scrutiny, before ...