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In re Damrill

September 14, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF DAMRILL, TIM, MINOR CHILD. STATE EX REL JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY, RESPONDENT,
v.
DAMRILL, APPELLANT



Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County. Harlow F. Lenon, Judge. No. 7259-G.

Darrell E. Bewley, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Francis F. Yunker, Portland.

Al J. Laue, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and John W. Osburn, Solicitor General, Salem.

Foley, Judge. Schwab, Chief Judge, and Fort, Judge.

Foley

Appellant, a 16-year-old child, was found to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by reason of his having committed an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult. ORS 419.476 (1)(a).*fn1 His appeal presents two assignments of error.

Initially, the child contends that the evidence brought out at the adjudication hearing was not sufficient to bring him within the court's jurisdiction.

The petition to the juvenile court alleged that the child had committed acts which, if done by an adult, would have constituted burglary in the second degree. ORS 164.215. The evidence introduced at the hearing established that he was riding in an automobile with several other persons when plans for the burglary were discussed, that he drove that automobile to the vicinity of the burglary, that several of the persons riding with him got out of the car and consummated the burglary, and that he either waited in the car while the burglary was in progress or left the area for about 30 minutes and then returned. Under these facts, the juvenile court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the child, with the intent to promote or facilitate the burglary, aided or abetted or attempted to aid or abet the burglars and would therefore be criminally liable for their conduct if he were an adult. ORS 161.155 (2)(b). That being so, the juvenile court was justified in finding him to be within the jurisdiction of that court.

The child's second assignment of error is that the court erred in admitting evidence of statements made by him to police officers where it appeared that

full Miranda*fn2 warnings were not given. The trial court found that Miranda warnings were not necessary in any event since he was not "in custody,"*fn3 and therefore it did not concern itself with the question of whether the advice actually given met Miranda standards. This conclusion was correct under the standards set out in State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971), cert denied 406 U.S. 974 (1972); State v. Travis, 250 Or 213, 441 P2d 597 (1968). See also State v. Brom, 8 Or App 598, 494 P2d 434, Sup Ct review denied (1972), and State v. Crossen, 10 Or App 442, 499 P2d 1357, Sup Ct review denied (1972).

No showing is here made that because of age, comprehension or psychological coercion, under standards of "fundamental fairness" prescribed by the Oregon Supreme Court, any advantage was taken of the child. See State v. Casey, 244 Or 168, 172, 416 P2d 665 (1966); State v. Gullings, 244 Or 173, 416 P2d ...


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